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Truthmakers (are indexed combinations)
Wolfgang Freitag
Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz
My aim is to show that theories which try to construct truthmakers out of objects
and properties/relations alone are not tenable: e Frege-Wittgenstein idea of in-
completeness does not yield truthmakers. Armstrong’s theory of partial identity
and the theory of moments, i.e., of non-transferable properties, yield truthmak-
ers, but these theories have counter-intuitive consequences. I conclude that the
notion of a truthmaker makes ontological demands beyond objects and proper-
ties/relations and propose that truthmakers are exemplication relations which are
necessarily tied to objects and properties/relations.
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1. Introduction
e proposition <the earth is a globe>1 is true. If it were false, the world
would look very dierently. A world in which a certain proposition is true
is dierent from a world in which this proposition is false. e dierence
between the truth and the falsity of a proposition reects an ontological dif-
ference. e investigation in truthmakers is the attempt to give an account
of this ontological dierence.
ere has been a steadily intensied debate on truthmakers, since K.
Mulligan, P. Simons, and B. Smith wrote their paper on this topic in 1984.
My aim is to give a systematic overview over prominent options, to show that
and why they are ultimately unsatisfactory, and, nally, to make a proposal
of my own: truthmakers are exemplication relations which are necessarily
tied to objects and properties/relations; in my terminology, truthmakers are
“indexed combinations.” Let me begin, however, by explaining the nature of
the problem.
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2. e argument for truthmakers
I shall start with an argument for truthmakers. Some propositions are false.
Some propositions are true. Consider the proposition <the pen is black>. It
is in fact true, though it could have been false.e truth-value of a proposi-
tion is not an arbitrary matter; it is determined by something. Whether it is
true or false is grounded in an ontological dierence. With the vast majority
of the literature, I shall assume that the ontological dierence is an onto-
logical addition in the case of truth; truth is established by an ontological
addition. us, I assume that the truth of a proposition is determined by
something that exists.2 It follows that there exists something which deter-
mines that the proposition <the pen is black> is true. Truth is ontologically
grounded.3 e philosophical term for this ontological ground is ‘truth-
maker’.
e label ‘truthmaker’ is a misnomer, because it suggests that the truth-
maker plays a causal role in the genesis of the truth considered—much as
in the case of the troublemaker, who plays a causal role in the genesis of the
trouble considered. However, although truthmakers cause trouble, they do
not cause truth. Itwould be better to call truthmakers ‘truth-determinants’—
those things in virtue of which a truth is true. But having freed the term from
possibly misleading connotations, I shall stick to the established usage.
at there are truthmakers in the minimal sense required by my argu-
ment above is, I think, undisputed. e trouble is to nd out what they are.
is is the truthmaker problem.
In the discussion, I will concentrate on truthmakers for contingent, pos-
itive, descriptive, predicative, nonreexive propositions, propositions of the
form ‘a is F’. Whether we have to account for the other kinds of proposi-
tions in terms of truthmakers at all, and whether we need the same kind of
truthmaker for them, shall not be a matter of the present paper.
3. Specifying the truthmaker problem
Since there are true propositions, truthmakers do exist. But where shall we
look for them? I assume that propositions are entities which represent (like
sentences and judgments are), i.e., they are about something. I shall also
assume that a proposition represents extrapropositional reality4 and that a
2 Whether its falsity is also determined by something that exists, I shall not discuss in detail
here. Usually, philosophers try to do without falsemakers and determine falsity by the lack
of truthmakers. I consider that to be the right strategy, but cannot discuss the diculties
it must solve in order to be successful.
3 See also (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005, 22).
4 I shall hence omit the complication that a proposition may be about itself or other propo-
sitions.
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truthmaker has the same ontological status as whatever the proposition rep-
resents. From this I conclude that truthmakers are part of the extraproposi-
tional reality. e truthmaker of <the pen is black> is not itself part of this
or any other proposition.
is expresses a viewofminimal realism concerning truthmakers. Truth-
makers so construed, however, do not commit us to a strong form of realism
—the view that there is an extramental reality. It may well be that truthmak-
ers are mental entities. Although I shall adopt a naïve realist standpoint for
the purposes of this paper, idealism in the sense of there being no mind-
independent world is also compatible with my views on truthmakers.
e upshot of my argumentationmay be stated as the “truthmaker prin-
ciple”:
(TM) For proposition <p> to be true, theremust be a part of extrapropo-
sitional reality which is a truthmaker for <p>.
(TM) is not undisputed. One type of objection is based on a certain under-
standing of Alfred Tarski’s conception of truth. Here the objection in the
words of Julian Dodd:5
Why must every (contingent, non-negative) truth be made true by
something? [. . . ] As we have seen, Tarski-style truth-theories explain
how sentences come to be true without positing truthmakers: ‘a is F’
is true just in case the object referred to by ‘a’ satises the predicate
‘is F’. As yet there is no reason to suppose that the worldmust contain
either the universal F or the state of aairs of a’s being F. (Dodd 2000,
10)
In a footnote, Dodd adds:
Here there is ontological commitment to a only, and not to a truth-
maker. (Dodd 2000, fn. 26, referring back to fn. 9)
I fail to see its relevance as an objection to (TM). Tarski-style theories, cited
by Dodd, do not deny the need for truthmakers. Rather they propose a spe-
cic theory thereof, namely that particulars (or—we might generalise his
case—sequences of such) are the truthmakers. Hence, this “objection” does
nothing to discredit the need for truthmakers. At most it discredits concep-
tions which postulate truthmakers over and above particular objects.
But are particular objects (or sequences of objects) truthmakers? In
Tarski-style theories, objects (or sequences of such) are sucient for the sat-
isfaction of an open formula.is is correct, yet also irrelevant. Satisfaction
5 Dodd criticises a slightly dierent version of (TM). e dierence is not essential for
present purposes.
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of open formulas does not result in truthmaking of propositions! e pen
alone does not make the proposition <the pen is black> true. It may be that
the very same pen exists without this proposition being true—e.g., when the
pen is green.
At this point it may be useful to introduce the distinction between “thin”
and “thick” particulars, which I take from David Armstrong. in particu-
lars are particulars “in abstraction from [their] properties” (Armstrong 1997,
123).ick particulars are particulars “taken alongwith all and only the [par-
ticulars’] non-relational properties” (Armstrong 1997, 124). us the pen
qua thin particular is the pen alone without any of its properties, especially
without its property of being black.e pen together with its non-relational
properties, e.g., its colour, is a thick particular.
e proponents of a Tarski-style theory have thin particulars in mind as
the things which satisfy. But the pen qua thin particular is not a truthmaker
for the proposition <the pen is black>. Only the pen qua thick particular
is such a truthmaker. With the thick particular itself, however, we already
have a fact (or a set of facts).6 As such, the thick particular is the target of
our explanation and must hence not be used as its beginning.
In a rst attempt to make the thin particular thick, the obvious move
would be to involve not only the thin particular (the pen) as truthmaker,
but also the property, i.e., the property of being black. In the case at hand,
we would not only need a, but also F. Does not the existence of (thin) par-
ticulars and properties suce for truthmakers? No. It may well be that both,
the particular a and the property F, exist without a’s being F. Particular a
and property F alone do not suce as truthmakers for ‘a is F’, because it
may be that they both exist but are not linked in the appropriate way. It may
be that this pen and blackness both exist, but that this pen is not black.
e line of reasoning showing that neither the particular nor the par-
ticular and the property together are by themselves truthmakers is based
on the necessitation principle putting a crucial constraint on candidates for
truthmaking:
(NP) In all possible worlds in which the truthmaker for the proposition<p> exists <p> is true.7
e particular, the pen, does not necessitate the truth of <the pen is black>
or any other true contingent predicative proposition; nor does the aggregate
of the pen and blackness. What is demanded is not an aggregate of entities
(particular and property) but their unity. e truthmaker problem is the
6 See (Armstrong 1997, 126). Armstrong uses the expression ‘state of aairs’ instead of ‘fact’.
7 Armstrong (2004b, 5–6) calls this ‘truthmaker-necessitarianism’, a label which I nd un-
necessarily cumbersome.
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problem of giving an ontological explanation for the connection between
object and property, of a’s having the property F, of a’s being F.
Before I start to discuss the responses to the truthmaker problem, I shall
introduce some terminology. In each specic case I have a deeper ontologi-
calmotivation for this terminology. Since this deeper ontologicalmotivation
will not play any signicant role for my arguments, I will only mention and
not discuss it.e point of introducing the terminology is to make the the-
ories to be discussed more easily comparable. I hope this will become clear
in the cases at hand.
e ontological explanation of a’s being F has usually been transferred
to an ontological relation called ‘instantiation’ or ‘exemplication’.8 I shall
instead speak of ‘combination’. e advantage of using the word ‘combina-
tion’ over using the traditional words ‘instantiation’ and ‘exemplication’ lies
in this: ‘Instantiation’ and ‘exemplication’ denote asymmetric relations and
hence presuppose a judgment on the nature of the relation involved. ‘Com-
bination’, however, denotes a relation that may be symmetric and hence is
ontologically neutral. For the purpose of this paper, I shall indeed assume
that this relation is symmetric, although I shall not argue for this view here.
is assumption has no argumentative but only an expository function.
e elements to be related by the combination relationwill be called ‘sec-
ondary contents’. is term covers both particulars and properties (or rela-
tions). Both a and F, this pen and blackness, are secondary contents. My
terminology is neutral on the question whether we have to divide the con-
tents of the world in two categories, that of particulars and that of properties.
I think this neutrality is welcome, since the alleged distinction between par-
ticulars and properties—resulting in the problem of universals—seems to
be motivated by the distinction between particulars and universals, which
arguably cannot, upon reection, be maintained.9 For the purposes of this
paper, I shall assume that secondary contents are ontologically on a par.10
Again this has expository function, only.
e term ‘primary content’ denotes possible combinations of secondary
8 ese are the more modern labels for Plato’s ‘methexis’.
9 I basically share Fraser MacBride’s (2005) scepticism on the alleged distinction between
individuals and universals, which underlies that between particulars and properties. My
views have evolved independently and have been presented in my dissertation (Freitag
2005).
10 Nevertheless there are dierences between secondary contents. ey have dierent
“forms”, dierent possibilities to combine into obtaining primary contents. e form of
this pen is dierent from the form of, say, this electron.is pen can combine with black-
ness, this electron cannot.is electron and blackness do not compose a primary content,
a possible fact. In this way, forms of secondary contents determine ontological possibili-
ties, the primary contents, by determining possible combinations.
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contents.e possibilities of the pen’s being green and the pen’s being black
are such primary contents. ‘Obtaining primary content’, nally, denotes tho-
se primary contents which actually obtain.ese are the (elementary) facts.
e pen’s being black is, and the pen’s being green is not, an obtaining pri-
mary content.
In this new terminology, the truthmaker problem is the problem of giv-
ing an account for the obtaining of primary contents, of giving an ontological
explanation of what determines that primary contents obtain.
4. edemand for a combination relationand theBradley regress
I shall now discuss several proposals which purport to explain obtaining
primary contents. We face the challenge of explaining how an object has
a certain property, the challenge of explaining what makes one secondary
content be combined with another. e secondary contents by themselves
are not sucient for the making true of predicative propositions. So let us
make the obvious move and involve a combination relation besides these
secondary contents. Does the set of the combination relation and the two
secondary contents to be combined nally settle our problems? Arguably
not. For it may be that all of these objects exist without the combination
relation holding between the respective secondary contents. Let me show
this with the following example:
If object a and property F are to be combined into an obtaining pri-
mary content by some combination relation—call it ‘C’—then it is hard to
see how this relation C could not itself be part of our ontology. But if the
relation C is to relate a and F, then its seems that a and F must be combined
with C, thus calling for a further combination relation between these three
entities. Now the same style of argument can be reiterated, starting an in-
nite regress of ever more combination relations. is is the essence of the
Bradley regress.11 e Bradley regress is based on the following individually
necessary and jointly sucient principles:
(C1) Whenever entities, e.g., secondary contents, are combined, then
there exists a further entity, which combines the entities to be com-
bined.
(C2) Whenever there is an entitywhich combines entities, it is also com-
bined with the entities it combines.
11 Actually, Bradley discusses the regress solely for the combination of objects and relations,
not for combination in general. But as most contemporary philosophers do, I shall use the
term ‘Bradley regress’ for this generalised version of the problem. I should also note that
the regress has been known at least since Plato’s Parmenides.
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e traditional account of combination naturally subscribes to (C1) and
seems to be forced to (C2). But then the Bradley regress, the regress of ever
more combination relations, is inevitable.
ere are several strategies for dealing with the Bradley regress. Some
authors acknowledge the regress, but assume it to be harmless. One of them
is Armstrong in AWorld of States of Aairs:
It is oen convenient to talk about instantiation, but states of aairs
come rst. If this is a ‘fundamental tie’, required by relations as much
as by properties, then so be it. [. . . ] Even if a ‘relation’ is conceded, the
regress is harmless. e thing to notice is that, while the step from
constituents to states of aairs is a contingent one, all the further steps
in the suggested regress follow necessarily. [. . . ] May it not be argued
that the sole truthmaker for each step in the regress aer the rst (the
introduction of the fundamental tie) is nothingmore than the original
state of aairs? Many truths if you like, but only the one truthmaker.
A natural comparison is with the truth regress. (Armstrong 1997, 118–
119)
Since Armstrong himself has given up this view himself, I shall not further
discuss it here. Suce it to say that most philosophers, e.g., Wittgenstein,
Mulligan et al., and Armstrong in a more recent book (Armstrong 2004b),
think the regress to be pernicious and hence try to avoid it altogether. One
strategy is to adopt (C1) but deny (C2). Peter Strawson (1959, ch. 5, sect.
2 and 3) speaks of “non-relational ties”—without, however, explaining how
there can be such things.12 My own theory will adopt Strawson’s strategy but
also attempt to give an explanation of how a “tie” may be “non-relational”.
Let me prepare the ground for my own view, however, by rst discussing the
most prominent strategy to avoid the regress: the strategy of denying (C1).
5. Wittgenstein and incomplete secondary contents
One of the earliest attempts in this direction is Ludwig Wittgenstein’s in the
Tractatus Logico-PhilosophicusWittgenstein (1922). Central to his theory is
the notion of incompleteness, which he borrows from Gottlob Frege. Frege
(1994), we recall, claims there to be a distinction between concepts and ob-
jects in the following sense: objects are saturated, complete entities, while
12 Actually, it is not quite clear that Strawson adopts (C1). He says: “Something analogous to
Bradley’s argument against the reality of relations may be used, not indeed to show that
relations are unreal, but to show that such assertible links [i.e., non-relational ties; W. F.]
between terms as these [i.e., secondary contents, W. F.] are not to be construed as ordinary
relations” (Strawson 1959, 167).ismay be taken tomean that these non-relational ties are
unreal, nonexistent, and hence that (C1) is false. e question would then be how unreal
things could be able to tie real terms together. So I prefer to interpret Strawson as arming
(C1) and denying (C2).
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concepts are unsaturated, incomplete. Concepts have, so to speak, a gap—
a gap which may be lled by objects. e incompleteness of concepts is
marked by Frege with the bracket notation, as, e.g., in ‘F()’. is notation
signals in a pictorial way the idea of incompleteness, besides marking con-
cepts as forming a special kind of functions.
Wittgenstein takes the idea of incompleteness and generalises its appli-
cation. For him, all secondary contents—objects and properties alike—are
incomplete. Secondary contents are completed only via their gaps’ being
lled by other secondary contents.13 Together with the idea that incomplete
entities cannot exist by themselves this yields the position that secondary
contents cannot exist without their respective “gaps” being lled by other
secondary contents. us no secondary content can exist on its own; every
secondary content needs to be tied to other secondary contents. Secondary
contents tied together, however, yield facts, obtaining primary contents.e
idea that secondary contents are incomplete results in the view that theworld
consists of obtaining primary contents only. As Wittgenstein says in tradi-
tional terminology:
e world is the totality of facts, not of objects. (Wittgenstein 1922,
1.1)
at Wittgenstein refers to the incompleteness of secondary contents in the
explanation of obtaining primary contents can be gathered from the follow-
ing statement:
In the atomic fact objects hang one in another, like the links of a chain.
(Wittgenstein 1922, 2.03)
Wittgenstein explains this as follows:
e meaning is that there isn’t anything third [in an atomic fact com-
prising two objects] that connects the links but that the links them-
selves make connexion with one another. (Letter to C. K. Ogden,
dated 23.04.1922; Wittgenstein 1973, 23)
e constituents of atomic facts are my secondary contents. As secondary
contents they are arguments and in turn have argument places themselves.
e characteristic of having argument places may be portrayed, following
Frege, with brackets indicating a gap in the secondary content. us, all
secondary contents can be represented by expressions of the form ‘x()’.14
13 us I considerWittgenstein to be the rst philosopher to reject the traditional distinction
between individuals and universals. Frank Ramsey, who is oen cited as the originator of
the attack on this distinction, may have inherited his ontological views fromWittgenstein,
by whom he was very much inuenced.
14 I ignore here the complication that secondary contents might have several gaps.
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We can write ‘a()’ instead of ‘a’, and ‘F()’ instead of ‘F’. (Let us stipulate
that the relative position of brackets to letter does not play a role. Instead of
‘a()’, we could also write ‘()a’, instead of ‘F()’, we could write ‘()F’.)
e obtaining primary content—the fact—that a is F is nothing but the
mutual completion of the respective secondary contents, i.e., (a)(F) (or,
equivalently, (F)(a)). One secondary content lls the gap of another sec-
ondary content, as one member in a chain hangs in another. e notation
of obtaining primary contents in the form ‘(a)(F)’, indicating that each sec-
ondary content lls the gap of the other, probably provides the closest logical
analogue to Wittgenstein’s chain metaphor.
e Frege-Wittgenstein idea of incompleteness, together with the claim
that there are no incomplete objects, necessitates that each secondary con-
tent is tied to another secondary content. Since there is no combining entity,
condition (C1) is rejected. We have combination between secondary con-
tents without there being a combinator. e Bradley regress does not get
started at all.
is was the theory; now to its criticism. Although the reference to in-
completeness looks promising, it is instructive to see why it does not do the
trick. Consider the situation in which there are exactly four incomplete sec-
ondary contents, objects a and b and properties F and G. If we assume that
both a and b individually combine with exactly one of the properties F and
G, and with nothing else, and if we assume that both F and G individually
combine with exactly one of the objects a and b, and with nothing else, then
two situations are possible:
W1: a is F and b is G. Or, in the chain-notation: (a)(F) and (b)(G).
W2: a is G and b is F. In the chain-notation: (a)(G) and (b)(F).
Both situations comprise exactly the same material, the same incomplete
secondary contents. Furthermore, no secondary content stands alone. Hen-
ce, there are no incomplete things. Both of the Wittgenstein assumptions
are fullled. Still, the situations dier; they comprise dierent obtaining
primary contents. Dierent propositions are true in these possible situa-
tions. e proposition <a is F> is true in W1, while it is false in W2. But
this means that the mere existence of incomplete secondary contents, e.g.,
of a and F, does not necessitate the truth of a predicative proposition, e.g., of<a is F>. Secondary contents alone (or sets of them) do not satisfy the con-
straints posed by (NP). So, incomplete secondary contents are not sucient
for truthmaking.
e incompleteness of secondary contents determines merely that the
world consists only of obtaining primary contents, of facts. It does not de-
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termine which primary contents actually obtain, and hence neither which
truths there are. As a recent author sums up this criticism:
Even if a and F-ness cannot exist except in some state of aairs or
other, there is nothing in the nature of a and nothing in the nature of
F-ness to require that they combine with each other to form a’s being
F. (Valicella 2000, 238)
e Frege-Wittgenstein reference to incompleteness does not yield a satis-
factory answer to the truthmaker problem.15
6. Armstrong and partial identity
David Armstrong, who has done much to popularise the quest for truth-
makers, has given several dierent treatments of the topic. For simplicity’s
sake, I shall conne myself to his latest ideas. He writes:
I have had a change of heart about the instantiation of universals. In
previous work I conceived of the instantiation as a matter of contin-
gent connection of particulars with universals. New work by Donald
Baxter [. . . ] has made me think that the link is necessary. [. . . ] I have
been convinced by him that what is involved in a particular instan-
tiating a property-universal is a partial identity of the particular and
universal involved. [. . . ]is in turn has led me to hold that instanti-
ation is not contingent but necessary. (Armstrong 2004b, 46–47)16
According to this new development, predication is supposed to be neces-
sary. If a is F, then a is necessarily F. e existence of a suces for a’s
being F. Whenever a exists, a is F. We could also say that F is constitutive
of a. I shall say that a is indexed to F and express this by using the notation
15 In the main text, I assume that Wittgenstein actually wants to solve the truthmaker prob-
lem by reference to incompleteness of secondary contents. Although I think this is the
most plausible interpretation, all things considered, there is also another possibility: that
Wittgenstein adduces the notion of incompleteness, not to explain obtaining primary con-
tents, but to explain primary contents simpliciter. Since incompleteness is used to explain
what Wittgenstein calls ‘Sachverhalte’, the matter hinges on how to understand this term.
In the beginning of the Tractatus it seems to be used in the sense of ‘atomic fact’ (i.e., in
the sense of my ‘obtaining primary content’). Wittgenstein himself even authorised this
translation of ‘Sachverhalte’.e chain analogy occurs in the passages which strongly sug-
gest this reading. Hence I take Wittgenstein to attempt to explain the obtaining primary
contents. However, starting with proposition 2.04, Wittgenstein speaks of obtaining and
non-obtaining Sachverhalte. is suggests that in these passages ‘Sachverhalt’ is his word
for possible facts, my primary contents. In this case, the reference to incompleteness would
have a dierent function, namely that of explaining how secondary contents can be com-
bined. Since this exegetic uncertainty is not of systematic relevance, I shall refrain from
discussing this matter in more detail.
16 Armstrong has expanded on this theme in (Armstrong 2004a).
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‘aF ’. e notion of an index is strictly distinct from the notion of an argu-
ment.17 While in theWittgensteinian option the relation between secondary
contents is one between argument and function, i.e., a contingent relation,
Armstrong pleads for a necessary relation between secondary contents by
the one’s being indexed to the other.
In virtue of its being indexed, the secondary content a has a hidden com-
plexity.e obtaining primary content of a’s being F is given by the existence
of a alone. In all possibilities in which a exists, a’s being F also exists. is
allows for a’s being the truthmaker for <a is F>. Or, to apply it to our pen
example, the proposition <the pen is black> is made true by the pen insofar
it is indexed to blackness.
In a sense, it is particulars which are Armstrong’s truthmakers. But
they are thick particulars, particulars along with their properties.ese sec-
ondary contents are truthmakers in virtue of their being what I shall call
‘transworld-faithful’, which I dene as follows:
Def.: An entity E is transworld-faithful if and only if for any secondary
content (or set of secondary contents) S to which E is tied in some
world, E is tied to S in all worlds.
In whatever possibility E exists, it is tied to S. e entity E is faithful to S
across all dierent possibilities. It is this characteristic which makes Arm-
strong’s a (or my aF) a possible truthmaker. It ensures that the predication
relation between E and S is necessary, thus fullling the constraints deter-
mined by (NP).
ere are several objections to Armstrong’s theory.18 Firstly, <a is F> is,
we presumed, a contingent proposition.ere are possibilities in which a is
not F. How can that be, given that a is supposed to be transworld-faithful?
Secondly, it is a consequence of Armstrong’s view that all properties of a
are necessary properties. Hence there is no distinction between necessary
and intuitively contingent properties. irdly, if a exists, then all primary
contents concerning a obtain necessarily. Facts, even ‘contingent’ ones, al-
ways come in packages.ere are no logically independent primary contents
about a: Necessarily, if <the pen is black> is true, then <the pen is in Tartu>
is true. But this is surely absurd.
To the rst objection Armstrong answers as follows:
17 e distinction between argument and index appears already in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
5.02 and the Blue Book, e.g., p. 21. In the Blue Book Wittgenstein uses the distinction in
the context of discussing propositional attitudes and for slightly dierent, partly semantic,
purposes. My usage of ‘index’ and ‘argument’ is strictly metaphysical. e terms refer to
purely ontological matters.
18 I shall discuss here only metaphysical objections and not, e.g., semantical objections
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What is contingent might not have existed. Suppose a to be F, with
F a universal. If this state of aairs is contingent, then it might not
have existed. Suppose it had not existed.e particular a, the partic-
ular with all its non-relational properties, [. . . ] would not then have
existed. Something quite like it could have existed instead: a particu-
lar with all of a’s properties except F. But that would have been only
a close counterpart of a, because the intersection with F, the partial
identity with F, would be lacking.19 (Armstrong 2004b, 47)
e demanded contingency of <a is F> is accounted for by the idea that a’s
existence is contingent. If a does not exist, then the proposition <a is F> is
false.us the proposition <a is F> is only contingently true. In a possibility
in which a does not exist, a mere counterpart of a may exist which does not
have the property F.e proposition <the pen is black> is contingently true
because it may be that the pen does not exist. e proposition the pen is
green , although false, can be true, because a dierent possible world might
harbour a counterpart of the pen which is green.
Taking resort to counterpart theory does also resolve (in a sense) the two
other problems. We may introduce a distinction between quasi-necessary
and quasi-contingent properties of a in the following way.ose properties
of a that are shared also by all of a’s counterparts are quasi-necessary prop-
erties. All other properties of a are quasi-contingent. In this way, we can also
introduce a quasi-independence of obtaining primary contents concerning
a. All obtaining contents involving a and its contingent properties are log-
ically independent. e others are logically interdependent. Importantly,
this strategy provides only quasi-solutions to the problems mentioned. In a
strict sense, all facts concerning the one and identical a are necessary and
logically interdependent. We get a quasi-independence only through the
quasi-identity between a and its counterparts.
I think that Armstrong’s refuge in counterpart theory is beset with prob-
lems. Firstly, a criticism ad hominem. Armstrong has long favoured a combi-
natorial theory of possibilities—basically the idea that possibility is nothing
but a possible recombination of secondary contents. If counterpart theory
is right, then we simply do not have the very same secondary contents in
dierent possibilities.is problemmay be evaded by taking instead of sec-
19 Actually, Armstrong’s view has also a further element, which I shall note only in passing,
since the complication introduced thereby is not absolutely relevant for our discussion. He
adds to the quoted passage: “Equally, it now seems to me, the universal F would not have
existed” (Armstrong 2004b, 47). is leads to further problems, since this would mean
that, once a does not exist, neither would F exist, leaving no room for the possibility that b
is F when a does not exist. Armstrong suggests as a remedy something like a counterpart
relation for universals, thereby coming close to a viewwhich the theory ofmoments, which
I shall discuss in a second, seems committed to.
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ondary contents equivalence classes of counterparts of secondary contents
as the basis of possible recombination. Whatever the merits of such a move
may be otherwise, it surely destroys much of the initial appeal of a combi-
natorial theory of possibility.
Secondly, wemay wonder whether a counterpart theory is well designed
for the job it is supposed to do. Consider Saul Kripke’s famous complaints
about counterpart theory:
e counterpart of something in another possible world is never iden-
tical with the thing itself. us if we say ‘Humphrey might have won
the election (if only he had done such-and-such)’, we are not talk-
ing about something that might have happened to Humphrey but to
someone else, a “counterpart”. Probably, however, Humphrey could
not care less whether someone else, no matter how much resembling
him, would have been victorious in another possible world. us,
[the counterpart theory; W. F.] seems to me even more bizarre than
the usual notions of transworld identication that it replaces. (Kripke
1981, 45, fn. 13)
So Kripke’s objection is basically that counterpart theory divorces an object
from its own possibilities and hence does not satisfy our intuitions.
I would phrase a related misgiving in the following way: since a coun-
terpart of a is not strictly speaking, i.e., numerically, identical to a, object-
language identity is replaced metalinguistically by a weaker relation, the
counterpart relation. I nd that manoeuvre dubious; replacing an identity
relation by a counterpart relation is like selling a van Gogh but sending a
Warhol.
Be that as it may, so far I have not come across any promising analysis of
such a counterpart relation. Armstrong himself oers only two idiosyncratic
constraints for such an adequate analysis, together with a rather feeble hope
that such an analysis can be given:
As a “one worlder”, I hope for a counterpart theory that does not in-
voke possible worlds other than our actual world; and as a natural-
ist, I hope for a theory that does not postulate actual entities over
and above the spatio-temporal system. I believe that these two rather
strong demands can be satised, but cannot discuss these issues here.
(Armstrong 2004a, 145)
7. Moments as truthmakers
Albeit Armstrong’s suggestion does provide for truthmakers, wemay remain
sceptical in view of the problems which accompany this solution. So let us
turn to its main competitor, based on the theory of moments. e rst to
put them to use as truthmakers were Mulligan, Simons and Smith in their
seminal paper Truth-makers. A moment is dened as follows:
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a is a moment if a exists and a is de re necessarily such that either it
does not exist or there exists at least one object b, which is de re pos-
sibly such that it does not exist and which is not a proper or improper
part of a. (Mulligan et al. 1984, 294)
Let me try to give the essence of this rather dicult denition: a moment
is a secondary content necessarily dependent on another secondary content
which in turn is not itself a part of the former (and hence not dependent
on it). Mulligan et al. give examples like the following: the-blackness-of-
this-pen, Voldemort’s-last-sigh or the-handshake-between-A-and-B. us,
moments can be monadic properties and also polyadic relations. According
to the theory, moments are the truthmakers for propositions. e proposi-
tion <the pen is black> is made true by the-blackness-of-this-pen, and <A
and B shake hands> is made true by the-handshake-between-A-and-B.
We have met the decisive characteristic of moments already in our dis-
cussion of Armstrong’s theory of partial identity. A moment is necessarily
tied to that secondary content (or set of secondary contents) to which it
is tied. In our case, the blackness is supposed to be necessarily tied to the
pen, and the handshake is necessarily tied to the set of A and B. Moments
hence are transworld-faithful; they are indexed secondary contents.20 e
secondary content blackness, understood as a moment, is necessarily tied to
this very secondary content, this pen.e pen is the index of the secondary
content blackness; it (partially) constitutes the entity blacknessthepen.
As Armstrong’s indexed particulars, moments are indexed secondary
contents. Due to their transworld-faithfulness, they have a hidden com-
plexity.21 ere is always a hidden object involved with any moment, thus
surreptitiously providing the complexity demanded of a truthmaker. A mo-
ment is nothing but an obtaining primary content in disguise.erefore, the
proposition <the pen is black> is made true by the entity blacknessthepen.
Again, the property of transworld-faithfulness gives moments the power of
fullling (NP) and hence of being truthmakers.
How does the theory ofmoments deal with the various objections raised
in connectionwithArmstrong’s theory, which seem to apply here, too? First-
ly, can the theory of moments account for the contingency of propositions?
Yes. Moments are, according to the theory, contingent entities. e propo-
sition <the pen is black> is contingent in virtue of the contingent existence
of the entity blacknessthepen. Transworld-faithfulness has the consequence
that a single moment may not belong to varying secondary contents in dif-
ferent possible worlds. But could it not be that a dierent secondary content
possessed the very colour of this pen, though it does not do so in the actual
20 Mulligan et al. (1984) speak of moments being “founded on” other secondary contents.
21 Armstrong (1997, 117) speaks of states of aairs “supervening” on moments.
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world? According to our intuitions, this could be so in a literal sense. Ac-
cording to the theory of moments, this is not possible in a literal sense. In
order to satisfy our intuitions, the moment theorist may introduce a coun-
terpart theory of moments, which then could also be used to answer the sec-
ond objection and to make a distinction between necessary and contingent
properties.—Albeit this is a viable option, a counterpart theory formoments
commits us, of course, to the same structural problems as the counterpart
theory for particulars.
Mulligan, Simons and Smith do not clearly commit themselves22, but
usually moments are also thought to have a second important characteris-
tic, namely that of being particularised. Accordingly, a moment is tied to
a single secondary content (or to a single set of secondary contents, in the
case of polyadic relations). e blackness is tied to a single secondary con-
tent only, namely, to the pen. And the handshake is tied to a single set of
secondary contents, the set of A and B. Moments then are—insofar as they
are properties—not universals; they are particularised properties; they are
tropes.
I shall say that particularised moments are “innerworld-faithful”, which
I dene as follows.
Def.: An entity E is innerworld-faithful if and only if there is exactly
one secondary content (or set of secondary contents) which is tied to
E in a single possible world.
It should be noted that this characteristic is logically independent of the
characteristic of transworld-faithfulness. A secondary content may be tied
to only a single other secondary content without being necessarily tied to it.
is blackness may be tied perhaps to this pen only, without being necessar-
ily tied to it. Innerworld-faithfulness does not imply transworld-faithfulness.
Conversely, it may be that this blackness is necessarily tied to this pen, but
that it is tied not only to this pen, but also to that pen, this shirt, etc. Black-
ness may be necessarily tied to many objects, and hence be a “universal.” It
may be transworld-faithful, but innerworld-promiscuous.
If transworld-faithfulness and innerworld-faithfulness are logically in-
dependent characteristics, and the former suces for a solution to the truth-
maker problem, why demand that moments are innerworld-faithful at all?
e deeper motivation lies, I think, in a certain nominalistic tendency of
the participants in the discussion. Innerworld-faithfulness denies moments
22 e authors repeatedly cite philosophers proposing individualisedmoments, e.g., in (Mul-
ligan et al. 1984, 297, 310). But they also proclaim to be “realists in respect to moments”
(Mulligan et al. 1984, 299), having earlier and somewhat puzzlingly explained realism to
be the theory that substances and moments are universals.
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the status of universals and conceives them to be tropes instead. Yet, in the
present context, this characteristic has further advantages. It avoids logi-
cal interdependence of contingent facts even without appeal to counterpart
theory. Suppose moments to be transworld-faithful but not innerworld-
faithful.e consequencewould be that, given that this pen and this shirt are
black, this pen and this shirt would both have to be black once the blackness-
moment existed—blackness would be indexed to both the pen and the shirt.
e consequence would hence be that the truth-values of <the pen is black>
and <the shirt is black> would be interdependent. If the one proposition
were true, then by necessity the other would be true, too.is consequence
is surely not acceptable. Whether the pen is black is logically independent
of the colour of this shirt. Once we demand moments to be innerworld-
faithful, however there are no dierent obtaining primary contents con-
taining the same moment. us, the problem of logical interdependence
is avoided from the very start. Even with transworld identity for moments
logical independence of the kind desired could be guaranteed.
Innerworld-faithfulness solves some problems, but it invites new ones.
It has the consequence that two objects never have, because they cannot
have, the very same property. ere are no properties shared by dierent
particulars; there are no universals. If two patches, a and b, are said to be
black, they have, according to this view, literally dierent properties, namely
the dierent moments the-blackness-of-a and the-blackness-of-b. But how
could that be squared with our intuitions that we are dealing here with the
very same property, as when we say ‘a and b are both black’? e answer
can only lie in something like an innerworld-counterpart theory that deter-
mines which moments are “the same.” Of course the objections which apply
to the (transworld-)counterpart theory apply mutatis mutandis also in the
present case. Does such a substitute for our intuitive concept of identity re-
ally suit our intuitions? If somebody has stolen a writer’s ideas, why should
the writer—or his lawyers—care? Aer all, the thief ’s ideas are not identical
(in the strict, numerical sense) to the writer’s ideas.
is objection is analogous to Saul Kripke’s objection against the (trans-
world-)counterpart theory. But perhaps we can dispense with this criticism.
e minimal requirement for such an innerworld-counterpart relation is
that it should be explained to us. So far I have not seen anything coming
close to satisfying this requirement.
8. A comparison of Wittgenstein, Armstrong and the theory of
moments
Let me now give a structural comparison of the three theories discussed.
ey all try to provide for truthmakers without appealing to a combination
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relation.ey deny (C1), the principle that in order for there to be combina-
tion, theremust also be a combinator. Wittgenstein’s solution is based on the
notion of incompleteness, but cannot provide truthmakers in the rst place.
Both Armstrong’s theory and the theory of moments involve the property
of transworld-faithfulness in order to make instantiation necessary. In this
way these theories successfully account for truthmakers, i.e., entities fulll-
ing the constraints made explicit in (NP). e necessitation demanded of
a truthmaker is introduced by the necessity of predication or, more gener-
ally, combination. e basic dierence between the two models lies in the
type of indexed secondary content chosen as the bearer of the characteristic
of transworld-faithfulness.23 Moment theory chooses properties as indexed
secondary contents, Armstrong chooses particulars as indexed secondary
contents.
e notion of transworld-faithfulness applied to secondary contents sol-
ves the truthmaker problem, but it creates new problems.e ontologically
most important ones are the following: the problems of accounting for con-
tingency, for logical independence of contingent facts, and of making the
distinction between contingent and necessary obtaining primary contents.
In reaction to them, the indexed secondary contents are themselves deemed
to be contingent objects, demanding then some sort of (transworld-)counter-
part theory for the indexed secondary contents. Most moment theorists go
even further and claim their indexed secondary contents to be innerworld-
faithful as well—thereby giving a straightforward solution to the problem of
logical independence, but also inviting new problems.
9. Indexed combination
According to the discussion so far, we seem to be caught in a dilemma.
Predication must be necessary in order to full (NP). is can be ensured
only through indexing. But the indexing of secondary contents has counter-
intuitive consequences, and hence is to be avoided.
Can we keep secondary contents index-free and still make combination
necessary? Not with an ontology of secondary contents alone. But expand
ontology to cover combination relations, and things will turn out just right.
I suggest that we should not index secondary contents but rather the combi-
nation relations. I assume the existence of combination relations and claim
them to be transworld-faithful. My strategy is essentially Strawson’s; his
“non-relational ties” are to be explained as indexed combination relations:
I shall arm principle (C1) and attempt to escape (C2), the principle that if
23 Of course, if secondary contents are all on a par, as I hold, then there is no relevant dier-
ence at all.
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there is a combinator, it must itself be combined with the things it combines.
Consider the case of the proposition <a is F>. Assume there to be a
combination relation, and assume further that the combination relation is
indexed to the secondary contents a and F. us, combination indexed in
the right way, call it ‘Ca,F ’, relates a and F necessarily—once it (i.e. Ca,F) ex-
ists. e secondary content a is an argument for F, and F is an argument
for a.us we may still assume an ontology of (incomplete) secondary con-
tents. But neither a nor F are arguments for Ca,F . Indexed combinations
have no arguments. e status of arguments is reserved for secondary con-
tents alone. Combination relations are not secondary contents. ey are
indexed. ey have indexes and hence possess a hidden complexity; they
are obtaining primary contents in disguise. In this way, they are suitable
truthmakers. Ca,F is the truthmaker for <a is F>.e proposition <the pen
is black> is made true by the existence of the combination relation indexed
to the pen and to blackness: Cthepen,blackness.
By indexing combination to (sets of) secondary contents, we get all the
benets that come with transworld-faithfulness. But how does the theory
of indexed combination deal with the diculties we have encountered in
relation to the theories of indexed secondary contents? Let us discuss these
problems in turn.
Firstly, to the problemof contingent propositions: I shall follow the same
strategy as the theory of moments and Armstrong’s theory do. e contin-
gency of a proposition is ensured by the contingent existence of the indexed
entity. Since the indexed entity is, under the present view, the combination
relation, a proposition is contingent not because of the contingent existence
of secondary contents, but because of the contingent existence of the com-
bination relation. <e pen is black> is contingently true, because the com-
bination relation between the pen and blackness need not exist.
Secondly, is it possible that the very same secondary contents, a and F,
gure in mere possibilities? Of course! Since secondary contents are not
indexed, they may be literally identical in dierent possibilities concerning
them. e very same secondary content is contained in dierent primary
contents. To illustrate this point with our example, assume that the pen and
blackness are combined.e very same penmight also have been combined
with greenness, and the very same blackness might have been combined
with a shirt. Secondary contents may remain identical throughout dierent
possibilities. e combination relation, however, cannot. e combination
relation is only in that possible world that is also actualised. Yet this is not a
vice; it is a virtue. In mere possibility, there is no actuality, there is no com-
bination relation indexed to secondary contents at all. A counterpart theory
for indexed combination is not only not demanded; it would even be absurd.
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irdly, how does the theory of indexed combination cope with the log-
ical independence of contingent facts? If the combination relation exists,
then all primary contents in which the combination relation gures do actu-
ally obtain. If there is one combination relation for all the facts, then they all
exist in exactly the same possibilities and are hence logically interdependent.
e consequence would be that, e.g., the truth-values of <the pen is black>
and of <the shirt is green>would be interdependent. Of course, the problem
is avoided in the present conception, according to which combinations exist
in the actual world only. is precludes logical interdependence of contin-
gent facts. An independent solution, however, is obtained by assigning to the
combination relation not only transworld-faithfulness, but also innerworld-
faithfulness.is is what I shall do. Two facts never have a combination rela-
tion in common.e truthmaker for <the pen is black> is C1the pen, blackness,
the truthmaker for <the shirt is green> is C2the shirt, greenness, and so on. Each
obtaining primary content is constituted by a numerically dierent combi-
nation relation.
To conclude this section on prima facie problems for indexed combi-
nation, consider the question of identity of secondary contents in dierent
obtaining primary contents. e very same secondary contents may be in-
dexes of dierent combination relations and hence be constituents of dif-
ferent primary contents. As in the previous “problem” cases, the theory of
indexed combinations simply abides by our intuitions straightaway.
Indexed combinations are much like particularised moments. ey are
transworld-faithful and innerworld-faithful. e only dierence is that the
bearers of these characteristics are the combination relations, not secondary
contents. Our intuitions demand innerworld- and transworld-identity of
secondary contents. Since these remain free of transworld- and innerworld-
faithfulness, we simply do not run into conicts with our intuitions. us
the theory of indexed combinations has all the virtues of the theory of par-
ticularised moments without any of its drawbacks. Indexed combinations
are just what we need.
10. Conclusion
I have argued that truthmakers are indexed combinations.ey are entities
which are not secondary contents. It remains a task for the future to better
understand this expanded ontology.
My thesis was here restricted to positive, predicative, elementary propo-
sitions. A full theory must take a stance on other kinds of propositions, too.
e question has to be answered whether the other kinds of propositions
must have truthmakers too, and what these truthmakers should look like.
I have not, in this essay, discussed the problem of nonsymmetric rela-
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tions. It may be that Tom loves Jenny but Jenny does not love Tom. is
means that we need to distinguish obtaining primary contents with exactly
the same secondary contents.e demonstration that and how the theory of
indexed combinations can cope with this problem must, like so many other
things, be reserved for another occasion.
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